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Business Groups have garnered growing attention of management scholars over the last decade 
(Colpan, Hikino, and Lincoln, 2010). However, the mainstream management, and specifically 
the international business literature appears to treat the phenomenon of Business Groups (BGs) 
rather as an epiphenomenon. Given the significance of, and recent growth of BGs this is rather 
surprising. In many emerging economies such as Brazil, Korea, Indonesia or Turkey, BGs make 
up more than half of the largest firms (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). 45 of the largest 50 enterprises 
in India and 28 of the largest 50 companies in Turkey are BGs and more than 80% of GDP in 
Korea is generated by BGs (Holmes Jr, Hoskisson, Kim, Wan, and Holcomb, 2016; Colpan, 
2010). But it clearly transcends emerging economies: in Western Europe alone, there are some 
26000 BGs, some of them of dominant influence, such as Wallenberg in Sweden, Agnelli in Italy 
or Mondragon in Spain. Beyond that in North America, Berkshire Hathaway, Koch Industries or 
the Weston group count among the most influential players in their respective industries (Colpan 
and Hikino, 2018). 
 
One reason for this neglect seems to be that, as Williamson (1975) has argued, conceptually BGs 
straddle the sphere between markets and hierarchies. The phenomenon of BGs– despite having 
been more extensively explored by the literature in recent years, remains multifaceted (Colpan 
and Hikino, 2010; 2018). BGs are a set of legally-independent firms, operating in multiple and 
often unrelated industries, whose economic activity is controlled and coordinated via equity 
stakes, privileged control rights, interlocking directorates, informal ties and others (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007; Ararat, Black and Yurtoglu, 2015).  
 
Until recently, economists assumed that diversified BGs could only exist in the absence of well-
functioning markets as functional substitutes of efficient external markets and strong institutions 
(Leff, 1978), an assumption that is challenged by the prevalence of BGs not only in less 
developed but also in mature economies (Jones, 2015; Colpan and Hikino, 2018). A particular 
area of interest in BGs in management literature appears to be their at times considerable 
engagement in practices that fall under corporate (social) responsibility, corporate sustainability, 
corporate citizenship and similar labels which we here use synonymously under the umbrella 
term ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR; see Matten and Moon (2008)). BGs, particularly in 
emerging economies, in various incidents, offer remarkable levels of financial, organisational 
and technological investments into the wider public good of the communities, countries and 
regions in which they operate. Examples are numerous: be it family governed BGs in India or 
Turkey, be it some of the Korean Chaebols or Japanese Keiretsu, be it large BGs in Latin 
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America or Europe – it appears that BGs are particularly situated in addressing social needs, 
poverty, governance deficits and institutional voids in welfare state provision and public 
governance.  
 
As such, the social roles assumed by BGs transcend the understanding of CSR in the traditional 
theory of the firm perspective. The latter sees corporate responsibility for the public good as 
voluntary policy choices, and activities which are expected to ultimately contribute to the bottom 
line (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Looking at the engagement of BGs for the public good 
though provides a much broader and richer picture. It includes those standard CSR practices but 
often goes significantly beyond this scope: in particular in developing/emerging contexts, BGs, 
through their charitable foundations- frequently named after the founders, or through their 
operating firms, address institutional voids, providing education and employment in areas where 
they are  most needed, products and services which essentially substitute and emulate what 
would be considered welfare state provision in liberal developed democracies. Beyond that, BGs 
are pivotal to the functioning of markets, the organization of the economy, and the basic building 
blocks of the political economy, so that the question at the heart of this call for papers - the 
responsibility of BGs for the public good - is as much an open research question as it has the 
potential to refine existing debates on CSR. 
 
This societal role, and the efficiency benefits of BGs, however, are far from being 
uncontroversial. Given their size and relatively high economic influence in their respective social 
contexts – BGs are often seen as being heavily involved in political rent-seeking (Kruger 1974; 
Schneider, 2010), investing primarily in political connections, as opposed to productive assets. 
Baumol (1990) argues that large, invasive, and corrupt governments can make political rent-
seeking the highest return on investment, and that this can stall economic development. This can 
be a stable situation in which particular rent-seeking BGs do well – their investments in 
government connections yield high returns in subsidies, trade protection, tax breaks, and 
protective barriers to entry; as do the politicians who favor them; but the economy suffers from a 
lack of genuine investment in productivity-improving assets and thus stagnates (Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung 2005). This is often referred to as an “economic entrenchment trap” since 
this phenomenon describes predominantly the strategic positioning of many BGs in emerging 
economies.  
 
Other concerns regarding the responsibilities of BGs circle around their relationships with their 
shareholders: corporate governance processes in BGs have often been discussed rather 
controversially. The finance literature emphasizes the amplified conflicts of interest between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors in pyramidal structures built by controlling 
shareholders through a chain of equity ties that provide ample opportunities for direct (La Porta 
et al., 1999; Almeida and Wolfenzon,2005) or indirect tunnelling (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2018). 
The main concern is that these organisations - often controlled by powerful families who through 
various instruments exercise control over the entire business with the purpose of maximizing 
their own wealth – thus disempower and often expropriate minority shareholders in the affiliated 
firms. During the past decades most of the empirical research in law and finance literature on 
BGs has focused on minority shareholder/investor expropriation through tunneling and self-
dealing (Djankov et al. 2008) and the adverse effect of BGs on financial development (Almeida 
and Wolfenzon, 2005).  
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The knock-on effects can have disastrous impact on the depth and efficiency (often the mere 
existence) of capital markets in those countries and their ability to attract equity investments. The 
possibility of expropriation furthermore encourages various forms of corruption, as evidenced by 
the scandal around the Italian BGs Parmalat (Melis, 2005) in the early 2000s. From this 
perspective, the question of whether BGs are “paragons and parasites” (Khanna and Yafeh. 
2007) is open to debate considering the structural effect of the collective dominance of BGs on 
the economy. Although this line of inquiry largely focuses on the BGs in the emerging and 
developing economies, developed economies have also been under the spot light (Belenzon, 
Berkovitz, and Rios, 2013; Carney et al., 2011) 
 
Despite the growing attention BGs have received in recent years in scholarly debates, most 
studies focused on why they exist and why they are persistent contrary to the expectations a few 
decades ago; while their impact, roles and assumption of social responsibilities for the wider 
public good have only received scant and, at best, anecdotal attention in the literature. For 
instance, the Oxford Handbook of BGs (Colpan et al, 2010) – a comprehensive overview of the 
debate around research in BGs – does not feature a single chapter or index item referring to 
corporate (social) responsibility of BGs. It is here where this Special Issue attempts at filling a 
significant gap in the literature. 
 
This article is organized as follows. We first provide an overview over the phenomenon of BGs 
and their basic features, as discussed in the relevant literature. We then characterize their CSR 
approach and explore existing theoretical framework regarding their potential to understand CSR 
in a BG context. We then highlight specific peculiarities of BGs in the context of CSR and their 
contribution to the public good. We then delineate some implications for the debate on CSR and 
the wider management literature which flow out of the analysis of BGs in this special issue. 
After briefly contextualizing the contributions of the special issue we then close with some 
perspectives for future research. 
 
 
2. The understudied phenomenon of business groups  
 
BGs play a large, sometimes a dominant role in many economies, however, empirical research 
on their economic outcome is scarce. BGs can broadly be described as “an economic 
coordination mechanism in which legally independent companies bound together with formal 
and informal ties utilize the collaborative arrangements to enhance their collective economic 
welfare” (Colpan and Hikino, 2010:17). The BGs literature often divides BGs into two broad 
subcategories: network type BGs and hierarchy type BGs although BGs around the world differ 
from each other widely with respect to organisational structure, and scope (Yiu, Lu, Bruton, and 
Hoskisson, 2007). Furthermore, BGs differ vastly with regard to geographical context and 
ownership structures. Figure 1 provides an overview over the different dimensions along which 
BGs have been analysed.  
 
 




Network-type of groups can be understood as “loose coalitions of firms which have no legal 
status (as a whole) and in which no single firm or individual holds controlling interests in the 
other firms” (Colpan and Hikino, 2010: 19). These groups do not have a central apex unit that 
has the potential to exercise control for the entire group, e.g. the Japanese horizontal keiretsu 
groups. Hierarchy-type BGs, on the other hand, “likens the BGs into a hierarchy in which a 
central unit controls legally independent operating affiliated firms that are tied together via 
several ties, including equity ties and interlocking directorates” (Colpan and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2018: 3).  
 
The hierarchy-type of BGs are the most examined type of BGs in the management literature that 
are further researched from two different analytical perspectives. Diversified BGs can be 
understood as the “collections of legally independent enterprises, linked through equity ties and 
other economic means, which have a central unit at the helm that controls the affiliated 
enterprises in (technology or market-wise) unrelated industries” (Colpan and Hikino, 2018: 6). 
Pyramidal groups, on the other hand, are “two or more listed firms under a common controlling 
shareholder, presumed to be the largest block holder voting at least 20 percent or, alternatively, 
10 percent” (Morck, 2010: 603). The focus of attention in the former is thus in the unrelated 
diversification of the groups, while the latter looks at the ownership structure and separation of 
control and cash-flow rights (Colpan and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018). Though may be analytically 
different, in reality however, diversified groups and pyramidal groups often overlap (eg. Tata 
group in India, Koç group in Turkey or the Wallenberg group in Sweden illustrate both unrelated 
product diversification and pyramidal ownership structure).  
 
The formation of diversified BGs has been explained basically from two theoretical perspectives: 
one that stresses environmental factors that drive the existence of BGs, and the other that 
considers intra-group organizational factors (Colpan and Hikino, 2010). The former can further 
be divided into two. First considers the immaturities and imperfections in product, capital and 
labor markets in developing economies as the main cause for the development of BGs. Because 
external markets in developing economies are underdeveloped, BGs emerge to form intra-group 
markets and fill in the gaps in the outside markets and market institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Second comes from political economy and considers 
government support and favor such as direct subsidies and lower interest rates, as well as 
protection of the domestic market to a number of selected entrepreneurs to be the main cause for 
the development of BGs (Schneider, 2010). Thanks to those privileges and advantages the 
particular entrepreneurs enjoy, they can enter into a number of diverse industries, as has been 
illustrated by the South Korean chaebol during General Park Chung Hee’s government (Kim, 
2010). Finally, another perspective focuses on the resources and capabilities of entrepreneurs and 
their enterprises. It is because of the contact (with overseas enterprises and government in 
particular) and project execution capabilities that the groups in emerging economies develop, 
they can use such functional resources and capabilities to enter into a multitude of businesses 
regardless of the technological or market-related links between businesses. The upshot is the 
building of BGs (Guillen, 2000; Kock and Guillen, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018). 
 
Although BGs play a large role in several countries, and often occupy a dominant presence in 
many emerging economies, empirical research on their economic outcome is relatively scarce 
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and mixed. The total value of a BG is difficult to calculate. First of all BGs frequently include 
privately held firms that are not subject to public disclosure rules. Second, even in the case of 
pyramidal groups with a public firm at the apex, holdings of the controller outside the group may 
not be visible at all. This opacity hampers the efforts to estimate the economic performance of 
BGs in a reliable way. While several studies report a positive association between BG 
membership and profitability (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Fisman and Khanna, 2004; Claessens, 
Fan and Lang, 2014), these studies at most treat BG membership as a binary covariate, which 
drops out if one uses a firm fixed-effects specification (Ararat, Black, Yurtoglu, 2015). Further, 
whether BGs create economic benefits; that is whether the benefits of common control accruing 
to all shareholders exceed any private benefits of control that are at minority shareholders’ 
expense is not clear. Calculating the total social welfare that includes the value of benefits 
accrued to all stakeholders is even more difficult.  
 
Some economists argue for restricting or dismantling of the BGs (Morck, 2009, Bebchuck, 2011) 
on the basis that they hamper competition, create systemic risks, enable controlling shareholders 
to capture political rents and influence political decision making. The ongoing debate about 
whether the BGs can enhance welfare, and if so under which circumstances and in which 
contexts, is outside the scope of this SI, but we hope our findings and conclusions will inform 
this inquiry.  
 
 
3. CSR and the public good in a business group context 
 
It is in some ways axiomatic to our argument in this overview article, and in fact to the 
arguments proffered by the papers in this special issue of the Journal of Business Ethics, to not 
define CSR in detail. In fact, by including the relation of BGs to what we refer to as the ‘public 
good’ we intentionally cast our net wider than the plethora of the existing definitions and 
conceptualizations of CSR in a literature that, as we argue here, has been mostly informed by 
notions of Anglo-Saxon business looking at a specific corporate form. Our interest here then 
includes a generic understanding of business responsibilities to society that encompasses 
business activities that respond to social expectations and have an effect on the public good in 
the social, political, environmental and economic environment of the firm. In applying such a 
broad perspective we explicitly also include impacts of a detrimental or harmful nature on those 
environments – which rarely and only recently have entered the debate in mainstream CSR 
(Mena, Rintamäki, Fleming, and Spicer, 2016).  
 
Group firms are different from independent firms from a CSR perspective for several 
reasons. First of all, CSR strategies may be motivated by group-wide strategies and 
considerations. For example, a BG with high level of investments in renewable energy, may 
sensitise all the firms in the group against climate change risks and encourage better 
environmental performance. Thus, it is not uncommon that BGs have group-wide CSR themes as 
building blocks of their corporate communication strategies. Second, the effect of reputational 
benefits (and risks) can be group-wide.  
 
A novel theoretical framing for the nexus of CSR and BGs can borrow from the “institutional 
void” paradigm as coined by Khanna and Palepu (2000) especially in emerging and developing 
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markets. This institutional framing is combined with the resource based view of the firm by El 
Ghoul et al. (2016) who report that CSR is more positively related to firm value in countries with 
weaker market institutions, providing some evidence on CSR as a non-market mechanism 
through which firms can compensate for institutional voids. These arguments can be useful in 
developing a theoretical framing specific to CSR and BGs in emerging economies, but not 
necessarily in developed markets.  
 
 
3.1. CSR, the public good and the role of business groups 
 
While several aspects of BGs such as their diversification conduct and pyramidal structures have 
been well researched, their business conduct and practices that fall under the notion of “corporate 
social responsibility” stay as an understudied phenomenon.1 In order to establish a picture of the 
relevant literature, we first conducted a search of the titles and abstracts of the term corporate 
social responsibility and one of the following words: business group, pyramid, keiretsu, zaibatsu, 
chaebol, guanxi qiye, grupos economicos, conglomerates and group affiliation. We searched all 
the relevant articles through EBSCO Academic Search Complete and EconLit as well as Google 
Scholar. Then, we deleted those articles that appear more than once in different search terms and 
locations. As we manually checked all identified articles, we excluded ones that do not relate to 
the corporate social responsibility of BGs. Finally, we classified those articles according to their 
national focus, sample period, keywords, manuscript type, and key findings related to CSR in BGs. 
Table 1 shows the relevant publications in chronological order in terms of their publication year.  
 
 
Place Table 1 about here 
 
 
As the table amply shows, the studies that examine the CSR activities of BGs are rather limited in 
number. They seem to have increased somewhat from the late-2000s with the overall increase on 
BG research in the management field. Those studies however examine a diverse number of 
emerging economies especially in Asia, and particularly South Korea. This may be explained by 
data availability about BGs in Korea. On the one hand, most studies argue BGs can effectively use 
CSR to justify their dominant presence in the economy and to further gain trust and acceptance of 
their status within the society. For instance, Min (2017) argues that Korean chaebol affiliated firms 
invested more on CSR activities to be more community oriented compared to non-chaebol firms 
after the 1997 financial crisis. As the Korean firms experienced legitimacy and sustainability 
threats with the financial crisis, chaebol firms effectively used CSR strategies to regain their social 
legitimacy. Cho, Chun, Choi (2015) also argue that chaebols tend to adopt CSR more efficiently 
than non-chaebols. Chaebols also have the tendency to fit CSR activities adopted domestically into 
their international diversification strategies. Studies looking at other nations such as India and 
Sweden, for instance the studies by Shah (2014) that examine the Tata group and Hoque, Uddin, 
Ibrahim, Mamun (2014) that analyze the Volvo group respectively, similarly argue that the CSR 
strategies of these groups have helped the enterprises to gain trust among their stakeholders and to 
curb potential regulatory interventions.  
                                                 
1 If we consider their ‘institutional filling’ and national development as a public good as well, then of course there is 
more work on this as shown in the review by Khanna and Yafeh 2007. 
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On the other hand, however, there are also a number of studies at the opposite end, which see the 
CSR investments of BGs as less extensive than non-BG firms, which are also used in superficial 
and socially-detrimental ways. For example, Oh, Chang, Martynov (2011) argue that managers 
in family owned BGs in South Korea are likely to use their power to only enrich the family at the 
expense of other public stakeholders. This in the end reduces the BG affiliated firms’ CSR 
investments as well as CSR ratings. Further, Choi, Lee, Park (2013) examine the relationship 
between CSR ratings and level of earnings management and find that such relationship is weaker 
for chaebol firms and firms with highly concentrated ownership. The authors thus argue that 
CSR practices can thus be abusively used by BG affiliated firms in South Korea to conceal their 
poor earnings quality. CSR activities by BG affiliated firms may thus be employed to hide 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors.  
 
 
3.2 Applying existing frameworks of CSR to business groups 
 
So far, we have argued not only that BGs are quite different institutions compared to forms of 
business which dominate much of the Anglo-Saxon discourse in business studies. In the 
preceding paragraph we also adumbrated some of their core activities and exposure to CSR and 
the public good. Ultimately, our goal with this special issue is to open the black box of what, 
descriptively, the exact nature of the firm looks like in many of the emerging and developing 
economies dominated by business, and by that token, descriptively encompass their CSR 
activities. Ultimately, as some of the papers in this special issue attempt to varying degrees, the 
goal has to be to theorize CSR related activities of BGs and come up with an alternative account 
of the nature of CSR in BGs.  
 
To that end then it is rather pivotal to, first, analyze and probe the potential of existing theoretical 
approaches to CSR for the context of BGs. Such a discussion appears useful, and in fact 
necessary, for a number of reasons. First, much of the work on CSR – even if generated with a 
rather different type of the firm as an empirical backdrop – might still have a partial application 
to BGs, too. In that sense, research in this new area should be cautioned against, as it were, ‘re-
inventing the wheel’. Second, and more important for theory building, it is pivotal to identify the 
limits of existing theorizations of CSR in order to build a more astute theoretical understand of 
CSR in BGs. We are aware, that our work here is all but a start of this project and we thus offer 
our analysis for future research on the trajectory of theorizing CSR in a BG context. 
 
3.2.1. Carroll’s model of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Definitions of and approaches to theorize CSR abound. They all differ mostly on the criterion 
that they reflect a specific social context (the ‘S’ in CSR) in which firms assume their social 
responsibilities. One of the more generic theorizations though, which to some degree 
encompasses most of those definitions and has been dominating the strategy and CSR literature 
on CSR for almost four decades is Archie Carroll’s ‘pyramid of CSR’ (Carroll, 1991). Carroll 
argues, that CSR is a construct that can be disaggregated into four main aspects, which 
successively built on each other and where the fulfilment of the previous are of responsibility is a 
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condition of the subsequent area of CSR. These areas are, first, ‘economic responsibilities’, 
followed by ‘legal’, ‘ethical’ and ‘philanthropic’ responsibilities.  
 
While we refer for details to the literature on Carroll’s framework, a few remarks seem 
appropriate. In the light of our discussion of main areas of CSR related engagement of BGs 
above it seems somewhat odd to place economic responsibilities as the first and most important 
responsibility of firms. In the light of the CSR activities of BGs it appears that philanthropy 
almost in most regions of the globe take a preceding role. This argument concurs with Visser’s 
(2008) adaptation of the Carroll pyramid for a developing country context (even though Visser 
eschews the question whether this is linked to a specific corporate form, such as BGs, see 
below). Rather than being the ‘icing on the cake’, as it were, philanthropy is a core social 
expectation which is not just ‘expected’ but in fact ‘required’ (to use Carroll’s attributes here) 
form companies. From a different perspective, philanthropy is not only a first order response but 
also a legitimacy instrument that represents a “compensation” or a “pay off” to the society for the 
privileges and protections offered to them by the state (Ararat, 2005; Bugra, 1994) 
 
Similar differences appear once we look at the nature of the different categories in Carroll’s 
model. As we pointed out above, and as some of the papers in this SI point out, economic goals 
of BGs are often much more long term oriented, much less reflecting immediate consumer 
demands in the market and short-term return interests of shareholders. Perhaps most obvious 
these differences become if we scrutinize ‘legal’ responsibilities of the firm. In the Carroll model 
these basically boil down to compliance. As we outlined above, BGs however, with their 
intricate relations to governments in the jurisdiction of their operations are less like passive 
pawns in the hands of law-making institutions but in many cases assume a role that actually 
actively shapes their legal framework. Moreover, in a context of institutional voids – to which a 
sizeable amount of BGs owe their existence and operational discretion, compliance with legal 
demands and rules is often a rather negligible social expectation on these businesses, especially 
when governments lack public acceptance. 
 
In conclusion then one could argue that Carroll’s model has some leeway in structuring and 
identifying social responsibilities of BGs. With regard to their prioritization, as well as to the 
specific demands and social expectations placed on BGs the model seems to be largely 
overlooking and misemphasizing different aspects of the four aspects of CSR. 
 
3.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2010) in its origins has rather strong roots in the (American) 
model of a shareholder governed firm, based on the classic separation between ownership and 
control (Berle and Means, 1932). In essence, stakeholder theory challenges the agency model, 
with shareholders as the only residual claimant on the firm whereby the objective of maximizing 
shareholder value ultimately maximizes the total welfare, and replaces it with a model where all 
parties affected by, and who can affect, the success of the firm have a legitimate claim on the 
firm to consider their interests. As such it is surprising that much of the literature engaging with 
CSR in developing countries and, in particular BGs, takes stakeholder theory as an appropriate 
framework (e.g. Rossouw, 2005). 
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On the surface this might make sense. After all, many BGs, certainly in the way they treat their 
employees or with regard to stakeholders that are recipients of their philanthropic engagement, 
appear to follow much more a model that sees the firm catering to a multiplicity of stakeholders. 
There are, however some crucial differences between the model of the firm stakeholder theory 
refers to, and certain fundamental trays of BGs. 
 
First, the clear separation between ‘the firm’ and ‘shareholders’ or ‘owners’ – as inherent in 
much of stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2010) – is somewhat more complex in the case of BGs. In 
BGs, the controlling owners often have the formal or informal authority to appoint the majority, 
if not all, of the board members even if they don’t own the majority of the shares. In family 
controlled BGs the controlling family members frequently sit on the boards themselves. 
Independent directors that are mandatory in most countries are rarely genuinely independent in 
controlled BGs (Bebchuck and Hamdani, 2016; Puchniak and Kim, 2017). With the exception of 
the lower level firms in pyramidal BGs where ownership and control are relatively more 
separated, the term “owner-control” characterizes the BG’ governance.  
 
Second, and closely related to the previous, the underlying purpose of BGs is vastly different 
from what underlies stakeholder theory, certainly in its descriptive and instrumental versions 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). From this perspective, stakeholder theory is often applied as a 
more realistic model for the firm to achieve its purpose, i.e. maximizing profits and shareholder 
return in the long term. Certainly, a large chunk of the CSR literature that refers to stakeholder 
theory is shot through with case-thinking; ‘roping’ in stakeholders and respecting their interest is 
just a ‘smart’ way of attaining this ultimate goal. As we discussed above, the purpose of many, if 
not most, BGs is somewhat more complex. Famous here is the often quoted statement by 
Jamsetji N. Tata, Founder of the Tata Group in India: ‘In a free enterprise, the community is not 
just another stakeholder in our businesses, but is in fact the very purpose of its existence’ (Tata 
and Matten, 2016). BGs pursue a multiplicity of goals, and profitability is often not the dominant 
concern, certainly not short or mid-term. As we will see in the next section many BGs see 
themselves rather as an intricate part of a certain societal, national or regional context to 
contribute to at various level is a more dominant concern.  
 
Finally, there are also palpable differences in the reasons for stakeholder engagement in BGs. 
The original model assumes some kind of ‘enlightened self-interest’ on the side of a corporation 
that understands that its success is predicated on an equitable relationship to all groups affecting 
the firm’s success. In many cases, especially in contexts of poor governance, vast income 
inequalities or institutional voids, engagement with stakeholders for BGs is more of a necessity, 
a necessary evil, rather than a deliberate engagement. In this context it is worth noting that in 
some jurisdictions dominated by BGs, most notably India and China, nowadays stakeholder 
engagement is no longer voluntary – which is a longstanding assumption about CSR activities 
incl. stakeholder engagement in the West. Afsharipour and Rana’s (2017) analysis suggests that 
efforts to develop a Chinese or Indian CSR model that ‘deviates from the voluntary CSR model 
of the West is in part rooted in the desire of each respective government to address uneven 
economic development, widening income disparities, and increasing public dissent in both 
countries’. Hence companies in those countries face mandatory requirements to engage and 
respect their stakeholders – which flies in the face of much of the assumptions of stakeholder 
theory, certainly in their normative interpretations (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
 10 
 
3.2.3 Corporate Citizenship 
 
Following the popularity of the ‘citizenship’ metaphor, corporate citizenship has gained traction 
as a theoretical concept in the broader CSR literature (Crane, Matten, and Moon, 2008; Matten 
and Crane, 2005). The gist of this debate, however, sees corporations closer to the role of 
governments than the role of citizens (see below). This is due to the fact that the corporate role in 
society, manifest in some – but not exclusively – of their CSR activities resembles strongly the 
role of governments in their role of guaranteeing and catering to citizen’s entitlements in a liberal 
democracy.  
 
This framework has indeed a rather rich application to BGs. Citizenship encompasses a bundle 
of rights, which differentiate into social, civil, and political rights. With regard to social rights, 
i.e. citizen’s entitlement to access basic elements of welfare state provision, we see that the 
philanthropic engagement of many BGs is directly engaging with those social rights. Access to 
health, education, affordable transport, basic social security are all activities taken on by 
government in post-war liberal democracies. In contexts of poor governance, poverty or 
institutional voids however, we see BGs stepping into the lack of governmental catering to these 
rights. Similarly, we see a role of BGs in dealing with civil rights, i.e. rights to protect individual 
freedom from external interference. These include property rights (incl. free markets for goods, 
labor and capital), freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom from bodily harm. In this 
area, the picture is somewhat mixed. In some cases, large BGs might play a role in providing 
these rights, as in respecting property rights of landowners or implementing health and safety 
measures. But one might also argue that their power and influence in their respective 
environments, put them in a role that infringes some of these rights, as the paper by Pattnaik et al 
in this special issue suggests. 
 
A third element of citizenship rights are political rights, i.e. the right to participate in societal 
governance processes. We will discuss this in the next section. 
 
3.2.4. Political CSR and the firm as a political actor 
 
Over the last decade a new debate has emerged in the wider CSR debate around the corporation 
as a political actor. Most dominantly, some authors have coined the term political CSR (Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2011; Scherer, Rasche, Palazzo, and Spicer, 2016) to describe the role of private 
businesses in wider societal governance. By political processes the debate refers to the 
authoritative allocation of values and resources in society – a role initially ascribed to 
governments, certainly in liberal democracies. While Scherer and Palazzo (2007) initially 
confine this role to Habermasian processes of deliberation, the wider debate encompasses a 
general role of business in a number of arenas where decisions around the wider governance of 
society are taken.  
 
In the context of BGs the notion of political CSR is quite a powerful conceptual lens to theorize 
their CSR related activities. Given the size, power, market dominance and accumulated capital 
associated with these firms in many ways their CSR related activities (or the absence thereof) – 
be it internally in the way they treat their employees, or externally the environment or 
compliance with the law etc., puts them in a position to play a key role in the governance of their 
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respective societal contexts. Beyond that, in particular in the way they, for instance, govern 
markets, structure access to and allocation of capital, or collaborate with governments in shaping 
the legal framework for the economy, BGs wield considerable political power in their respective 
societal environments. Some of the contributions in the special issues speak quite unequivocally 
to such a role. 
 
 
4. Core issues in analyzing business groups from a CSR angle 
 
The papers in this special issue highlight some of the specifics of CSR in BGs. Emerging themes 
focus around (1) the relation between CSR and the governance of the BG, most notably the 
influence of ownership, (2) the dominant role and specific nature of philanthropy as the main 
expression of CSR in BGs, and (3) the corporate (ir-)responsibility in the market power and 
control of BGs and their relations to governments.  
 
 
4.1 Corporate governance and the role of ownership 
 
Governance of controlled companies has been a key concern from the perspective of economic 
responsibilities. The primary governance problem in controlled firms concerns the agency 
problems between controlling shareholders- the ‘common controller’, and public investors. In 
BGs, the common controller has the incentive to monitor and discipline management and 
enhance the collective value of the affiliated firms. Furthermore, in weak institutional settings a 
good reputation of the controller can facilitate trust among investors, customers, and suppliers. 
However, common controllers also may have the means to divert value between the group firms 
and to the outside of the group at the expense of minority investors (Holmen, Hogfeldt, 2009). 
The propensity of value diversion and overinvestment is higher in pyramidal BGs where voting 
rights are separated from cash flow rights, especially at the lower levels of the pyramid where the 
controller can control the firm without risking proportionate  amount of capital. The diversion of 
value can take many forms including related party transactions that favor them or excessive 
compensation to the managers affiliated with the controller (Bae et al, 2012). The propensity to 
divert value results in large discounts in the market value of individual firms within the group 
(Claessens et al., 2002). 
 
A particular corporate governance issue from CSR perspective is the opacity of group 
governance arrangements and informal conrol structures. The non-existence of pyramidal BGs in 
the US and UK, whose corporate governance norms have inspired the emerging and developing 
economies, largely ignore BGs. The concepts of “piercing the corporate veil” and “shadow 
board” where the actual directors of a company are accustomed to act in accordance with an 
outsider’s directions or instructions has not been explored in BG context and have not been 
adequately addressed in corporate governance regulations with a few exceptions (e.g. see Reich-
Graeffe (2005) on German Stock Corporation Act, and Cankorel (2015) on Group of Companies 
in Turkish Commercial Code).  
 
Another corporate governance concern is the value diversion from the companies to the 
charitable foundations, of which the income consists of donations by the BG affiliated firms. 
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These foundations enhance the reputation and the credibility of the controlling shareholder, 
frequently a family, at the expense of minority investors (Kim et al, 2017, Bae et al., 2012). 
Whether the benefits of good reputation of the controlling shareholders enhances the value of BG 
firms is an empirical question. It is possible that CSR investments  may decrease firm value 
through opportunistic exploitation of resources by controlling shareholders (Pagano and Volpin 
2005; Masulis and Reza 2015). 
 
The first two papers discussing the specific governance structures of BGs and their effect on 
CSR draw on data from Korea and India – two countries with quite a substantial influence and 
dominance of BGs in the local economy. 
 
Choi, Jo, Kim and Kim’s paper in this special issue attempt to answer two related questions: 
whether the CSR behaviours of group firms are different from those of non-group firms, and if 
so, whether and how such behaviors are related to the ownership disparity between cash flow 
right and control rights referred to as ‘wedge’ and associated with the propensity to expropriate 
(Villangola andAmit, 2009) . They first provide convincing evidence that group affiliation is 
associated with higher overall CSR proxied by the environmental and social performance ratings 
of the affiliated firms, however; cash flow-control ownership disparity by controlling inside 
shareholders of group firms is associated with lower CSR. They argue that these results indicate 
that opportunistic rent-seeking behaviours by controlling shareholders may reduce resources 
available for CSR in affiliated firms. An interesting result of their study is that BG affiliation is 
associated with lower Tobin’s Q, but it may enhance firm value if group firms practice CSR 
consistently. Furthermore, the authors provide supporting evidence that the effect of long-term 
consistent CSR, on shielding the firms from reputational damages recently documented by Shiu 
and Yang(2017), is stronger for group firms especially at the time of group-specific negative 
events, buffering them from bad outcomes. 
 
In a similar comparative vein, the paper by Ray and Chaudhuri examines whether BG affiliated 
firms differ from non-BG affiliated firms in their corporate sustainability strategy (CSS). They 
also look at how the BG affiliation influence the relationship between stock of fungible resources 
and CSS of firms. By using a proprietary data set of 163 Indian publicly listed firms (that include 
both BG affiliated and non-affiliated firms), the authors show that BG affiliated firms tend to 
adopt environmental and social sustainability strategies more than non-BG firms. The major 
factors contributing to BG affiliated firms to implement more CSS is that BGs tend to focus 
more on building and maintaining group-level identity, are less sensitive towards short-term 
financial performance, have historical roles in filling up institutional voids and benefit from the 
inter-firm network that they are parts of. Furthermore, the authors also show that stock of 
fungible firm-level resources are less important for the CSS of BG affiliated firms, as they have 
access to the BG network and can benefit from the resources within such network that they can 
readily exploit.  
 
The paper by Terlaak, Kim and Roh focuses in particular on the thorny issue of family ownership 
and its relationship to CSR. In particular the aspect of disclosure of CSR is an ambiguous issue 
in BGs as family ownership in general makes BGs more secretive and lowers the propensity for 
disclosure – with all its negative and ethically questionable implications. The findings of this 
paper though point to aspects beyond this tacit assumption: by looking at levels of family 
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ownership as well as family leadership of the BG the paper demonstrates that higher levels of 
ownership, and the engagement of a family member as CEO or other leading roles within the 
group enhances the levels of disclosure. This points to an interesting conclusion: if a certain 
family is closely engaged and actively involved in a BG the positive effects of reputational gains 
of CSR appear more attractive, as they directly enhance the public perception not just of a BG, 
but also of its controlling family. 
 
 
4.2 Corporate philanthropy as a dominating form of CSR  
 
Three papers in this special issue focus on the philanthropy and provision of social goods as a 
main form of CSR of BGs, mostly linked to their dominant presence in developing and emerging 
economies. A theoretical paper by Cuervo-Cazurra conceptualizes the evolution of CSR 
investments by BGs in different stages of economic development based on the interaction 
between two drivers; the level of infrastructure deficiencies and the cost of externalities resulting 
from their economic activities. His model foresees a quadratic “CSR investment level” function 
based on the level of economic development. In underdeveloped economies, CSR investments 
are predicted to be higher and focused on the social dimensions of CSR through philanthropic 
investments, whereas as economies emerge and infrastructure deficits become lower, CSR 
investments evolve to a richer environmental and economic responsibility, albeit at a lower level. 
The level of CSR investments would go up again as economies become advanced. In advanced 
economies CSR investments become a source of innovation and competitive advantage for the 
group firms as they address and minimize negative externalities specific to the group. As such 
the model provides a useful theoretical reference frame for studying the engagement of BGs in 
furthering the public good with a historical perspective. Much of the CSR of BGs in developing 
economies is targeting infrastructure deficiencies, social needs – and thus in general – 
philanthropy – as illustrated by some of the empirical contributions in this special issue. This is 
also consistent with the existence of BGs in the first place which is more prevalent in developing 
and emerging economies, where hierarchy and networks, rather than markets and a reliance of 
functioning institutions makes the specific form of organising of these economic actors makes 
for a more efficient form of organising. The paper highlights also the necessity for further 
research in the specific nature of the firm in those economies: while comparative studies in CSR 
in developing countries abound, there is very little attempt to explain those specific forms of 
CSR with the specific nature of those firms (e.g. Jamali and Karam, 2018). Cuervo-Cazurra’s 
article also discusses three types of contingencies in the relationship between the CSR and the 
level of economic development; industry effects to incorporate resource intensity, societal values 
and culture, and the level of democratization. The proposed framing might offer a fruitful basis 
for further investigation into these issues and to open the ‘black box’ of BGs, which still 
characterize much of the literature on CSR in developing economies (Jamali, 2016). 
 
The paper by Griffin and Youm casts light on two specific differences between CSR in BGs and 
CSR as discussed it in most parts of the traditional literature. First, the paper illustrates that the 
business case argument of CSR is of little importance to BGs, as they demonstrate with their 
sample of Korean chaebols. Rather, the main argument for engaging in CSR activities is the 
search for social legitimacy of those large BGs which have obviously a strong visibility, 
presence and power in the Korean economy. Second, the paper illustrates that the core focus of 
 14 
CSR for many of those BGs are still philanthropic or charitable contribution, a finding echoed by 
other studies looking at CSR in a comparative perspective (Witt and Redding, 2013). This aspect 
also reveals one of the points made earlier that account for a relative dearth in studies, i.e. the 
accessibility of data and the transparency with which CSR is conducted by BGs. The reason for 
this, as the authors speculate, is more due to the fact that philanthropy as part of CSR is more 
seen as part of the general, institutionalised role of BGs in Korean society, rather than a specific 
activity deemed CSR. This social role assigns corporations a more implicit role in their prosocial 
behaviour, rather than perceiving this as a strategic choice and part of managerial discretion. 
 
High-quality corporate giving data are available in Korea, since companies report their 
charitable contributions on the audited financial statements. Making use of this data, Oh, 
Chang, Lee and Seo’s investigation sheds some light on the relationship between philanthropy 
and related party transactions between publicly listed firms within the group, although the 
authors investigate the relationship with the theoretical lens of the “attention based view of the 
firm” (Ocasio, 1997). Simply put, their results suggest that publicly listed BG firms with higher 
levels of “intragroup” sales have lower levels of corporate philanthropy. Using data on Korean 
BG firms, their results suggests that decision makers will increase the level of corporate 
philanthropy at the publicly listed group-firm level when the firm is less dependent on intra-
group sales and dependent more on external markets. This negative effect of intra-group sales on 
philanthropy is positively moderated by the level of presence of outside (independent) directors 
above the level of regulatory requirement, and the level of foreign investor ownership, 
suggesting that the level of corporate philanthropy decreases when the firm opts for increased 
monitoring by outsiders. These results may support the view that BGs firms may not be 
homogeneous with respect to their corporate social responsibility practices subject to the 
individual role the firm in the internal market, the relevant importance of external markets and 
the strength of corporate governance.  
 
 
4.3 Market control and government relations  
 
One of the interesting aspects of discussing CSR in a BG context is the fact that besides their 
considerable engagement in philanthropy their broader impact on society goes beyond the classic 
‘toolbox’ of CSR (according to textbook definitions such as Carroll’s, above). In many countries 
of their operation their dominant social role is that of providing access to vital goods and 
services. As such, they have historically enjoyed special relations and protections from 
governments in many countries, and due to their often market dominating role, have wielded 
considerable control over the economy. As such, as Khanna and Palepu’s (2007) meanwhile 
classic question as to whether they are ‘paragons’ or ‘parasites’ is also vital for the assessment of 
their contribution to the public good beyond their explicit CSR policies and activities. As such, 
quite a strong element of BG’s CSR can be referred to as ‘implicit CSR’ (REF), i.e. that BGs 
contribute to the public good just through their institutionalized role in their particular economic 
context. There are two papers in this special issue which deal with this ambiguous impact of BGs 
on the public good and highlight what we could refer to as the dark side of CSR by BGs. 
 
The paper by Pattnaik, Quiang and Gaur casts a somewhat different light on the role of BGs in 
emerging markets. In the language of Carroll’s model of CSR (see above) the authors argue, 
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first, that BGs play a rather ambiguous role with regard to the ‘economic responsibilities’ of the 
firm. While BGs often provide essential goods and services in developing and emerging 
economies, their size and control of markets results in relative competitive disadvantages for 
smaller, independent businesses. Pattnaik et al examine such market control in the Indian context 
and provide a differentiated picture of the nature of such market dominance of BGs and the entry 
barriers for new market entrants they can impose. Overall, they find that concentration of 
industrial investment activities by BGs is economically counterproductive in the long run due to 
the entry barriers that they create for unaffiliated firms and smaller BGs. The paper extends the 
earlier analysis of the effect of BGs on capital markets (Pattnaik et al. 2013) to product markets. 
It also contextualises the influence BGs can wield on regulators and, in general, the government 
of those countries by dint of their size and basic provision of vital goods. As such this paper also 
hints at the political role BGs might assume in their specific societal contexts.  
 
An interesting inquiry by Su and Tan focuses on off-shore companies in tax -havens in BGs. 
Having offshore companies in tax havens may enable the groups to bypass some market 
transaction costs and overcome institutional constraints, protect assets against volatile markets, 
but may also provide the opportunity to evade taxes and disguise unethical or illegal conduct, 
such as political donations and bribery. Prior research suggests that larger and more diversified 
BGs are more likely to engage in self-dealing, tunnelling and political rent-seeking (Claessens et 
al, 2002). Su and Tan, investigating the BGs in Taiwan, report that more diversified BGs are also 
more likely to establish off-shore companies in tax-havens. Their results suggest that pro-social 
orientation, measured by the level of BG’s charitable establishments have a negative moderating 
effect on this relationship for internationally diversified BGs, but has no effect on the BGs with 
high levels of industry diversification. A secondary finding the authors report is that the BGs 
with more off-shore companies in tax havens have lower effective tax rates.  
 
 
5. Business groups and their social role as an understudied phenomenon 
 
By and large, the phenomenon of BGs and their role in CSR as well as their relation to the public 
good can be considered an understudied phenomenon. There are a number of reasons for this. 
First, one could argue that academic institutions and research work in many of the countries in 
which BGs are dominant players, on the whole, have only recently found a stronger voice in the 
global, Anglo-American discourse on management research in general, and in particular in CSR 
research. Another reason might also be, since BGs are very strongly embedded in a particular 
culture and local institutional frameworks, access for global researchers could often be mired by 
obstacles, incl. language barriers, lack of networks and limits in an intricate understanding of 
local contexts. At the same time, all those regions of the globe where BGs are pivotal players in 
the economy are also those areas where we see the largest growth in academic research currently 
alongside with their increased collective economic significance. It is our hope that a special issue 
that deliberately makes BGs as a specific corporate form the center of investigation, can open a 
discourse that might inform and inspire future research in this area.  
 
Building on the last observation it has to be said though that, indeed, we have seen a surge of 
research in CSR in developing or emerging economies (Jamali and Karam, 2018). Looking at 
this literature though, there is often a very blunt application of theories and concepts generated 
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by the global discourse to the West. And while some work in this area appreciates and 
conceptualizes the specific institutional context of those developing countries, the tacit 
assumption of much of the work is still that businesses in those parts of the world are basically 
the same as in developed/Anglo-Saxon economies. Basically, the firm more often than not is 
treated as a black box. Data limitations are also constraining; prevalent disclosure standards 
largely built upon the experiences of developed markets do not recognize BGs as a reporting 
entity. Consequently, empirical studies typically operationalize BG affiliation as a dummy 
variable at the individual firm level. Even then the data on affiliations are frequently provided by 
country specific institutions or stock market guides in only a few countries such as Korea, 
Taiwan and India. This explains the relatively richer literature on BGs in those countries and the 
focus of submitted papers to our call for papers on BGs and CSR. In this special issue we hope to 
have at least opened the black box somewhat to allow an appreciation of the specific corporate 
form in many of those contexts and regions. We argue that it is vital to understand the 
idiosyncratic nature of business in these contexts to explain and theorize their CSR approach and 
their impact on the public good. 
 
It is here, where we would argue that this special issue can actually make a contribution not just 
to what many might still consider an epiphenomenon of business studies – CSR – but feed in and 
inform ongoing debates on the nature of the firm and its boundaries. For quite some time 
management academy has raised the question whether we still base our academic field on an 
adequate theory of what a firm actually is. Latest since the financial crisis of 2008, but already 
earlier in the aftermath of the crises around 2000, anxieties around the adequate model of the 
firm have been increasingly subject of an emerging debate (Baars and Spicer, 2017; Barley, 
2007; Child, 2002). Those concerns are particularly informed by an apparent lack of social 
responsibility of business as an institution and its detrimental influence on the public good, as 
exemplified by the ripple effects of the financial crisis globally. 
 
One of the reasons then, we would posit, why BGs have so far played a marginal role in those 
debates then has to do with the challenge that they do not fit into the currently still dominating 
model of the firm in management academia. One of the milestone contributions on this ongoing 
debates by Donaldson and Walsh (2015) might serve as both an illustration for why BGs have 
played such a marginal role in the debate, but also for understanding how a more adequate theory 
of the firm might open a larger conceptual space to integrate BGs as one pivotal institutional 
template for what a firm looks like. 
 
 
Place Table 2 about here 
 
 
Donaldson and Walsh suggest a new theory of business which, they argue, empirically and 
normatively provides a more realistic and societally more beneficial understanding of the firm 
(see Table 2). If we look at the characteristics of the neo-classical theory of the firm, it is very 
clear by now that many of those features have only a limited application to BGs – if at all. 
Certainly with regard to Purpose, Accountability or Success, BGs differ at times quite 
considerably from such a theoretical model of what a business is about. 
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Examining what Donaldson and Walsh suggest as an alternative theory of business it becomes 
immediately clear in the light of our discussion in this paper so far, that empirically many BGs 
come quite close to these features. This applies most notably to the purpose of the firm: many 
BGs (particularly in emerging economies) understand their role in society in a much more 
comprehensive way not just as maximizing the value of the firm presently, but doing so for 
future generations (for instance in the case of family ownership, see Weston, 2016) or for a wider 
constituency of communities affected by the BG. This wider purpose for many BGs also informs 
the scope of accountability of the firm, as some of the papers in this special issue demonstrate. In 
particular BGs which have a longstanding tradition in CSR (or their predecessors such as 
paternalism) see the dignity of their wider community at its core. The textbook example is 
certainly the Tata BG where management from its inception until today sees itself intricately 
involved in ‘nation building’ against and after British colonial rule. In a similar vein the notion 
of collective value, or in other words, a contribution to the public good, is something BGs are 
much more open to. Many BGs see themselves rather as an intricate part of a certain societal, 
national or regional context to which to contribute at various level is a more dominant concern. 
This may be related to the fact that diversified BGs are exposed to the spill over effects of 
externalities from one industry at a cost for other industries they operate in; they are long-term 
oriented, and the health of the collective business is more sensitive to country risks. From this 
perspective the reference to the controlling shareholders of BGs as ‘national owners’ is 
analogous to the conceptualisation of global diversified investors as ‘universal owners’(Hawley, 
2007). 
 
Linking the contributions of this special issue then to the ongoing debate about an adequate 
theory of the firm reveals that any pursuit of this nature has to look at alternative ways to 
organize private business in a capitalist system and to look beyond the model that currently 
dominates most developed, and especially Anglo-Saxon, economies. In particular the focus on 
CSR and how BGs relate (for better or for worse) to the public good suggests a much broader 
remit and role of business. While the CSR literature in recent years has opened up to look at 
other forms of business, such as SMEs, family owned businesses or state owned enterprises, the 
focus on BGs can enrich and inform this debate significantly. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
In conclusion we would argue that this special issue in its exploratory nature can provide the 
contemporary scholarly debate with some impulses in many directions. First, we would argue, 
that engaging with BGs as a specific actor in organizing CSR and the corporate role in society in 
general can contribute to a more refined understanding of the nature of the firm, its boundaries, 
and its implications for CSR. Second, this special issue can in some ways empower and lend a 
voice to CSR related research in emerging economics and more generally those parts of the 
globe out of which currently a flurry of CSR related work is currently originating and where the 
bulk of graduate research is expected to be generated within the next decades. Finally, 
investigating the social role of BGs provides a unique perspective on the ambiguities of CSR and 
the ongoing necessity to find broader, system level solutions to many of the criticisms 




6.1 The nature of the firm 
 
Regarding the nature of the firm it is striking that despite a surge of work on CSR and business 
ethics in the developing and emerging economies there has been little attention to the specific 
nature of the dominant firms in those parts of the globe. The tacit assumption in much of this 
body of country-, regional- or comparative studies is to treat firms as a ‘black box’ and tacitly 
assume that companies in, say, Korea, India or China are basically similar and comparable to the 
publicly owned, shareholder governed firm that dominates much of the management literature. 
This pertains particularly to the influence of family ownership and state ownership of BGs – 
even though the latter aspect did not feature prominently in this special issue. As Matten and 
Moon (2008) have argued the shape and content of CSR is heavily dependent on the ‘nature of 
the firm’ and it is therefore indispensable to understand the forms of CSR enacted in emerging 
economies in which BGs are dominant players.  
 
A great example for the perils of ignoring the nature of the firm is the rather confused and 
misleading ongoing debate in Western scholarly outlets around the Indian Companies Act 2013 
(Gatti, Vishwanath, Seele, and Cottier, 2018). Such criticism focuses on the issue of making 
CSR mandatory and around the question whether this legislative approach assigns corporations a 
role that ideally governments should assume. The logic of the Companies Act though becomes 
only clear when understanding the specific nature of the firm. In mandating 2% of net profits to 
be spent on CSR for the 6000 largest Indian companies the intention of the Act clearly targets the 
already existing capacities, skills and governance mechanisms of companies to provide basic 
welfare provision (i.e. hitherto philanthropy or charity). Rather than just taxing companies the 
idea is to avoid more resources flowing into a largely inefficient and often poorly governed 
public sector but to use the already existing governance infrastructure of BGs as dominant actors 
in the Indian economy to deliver those social goods. The rationale of such an approach can only 
be understood if, on the one hand, one appreciates the institutional voids and deficiency of the 
public governance system in India, and on the other hand the considerable capacity of private 
businesses to actually deliver those welfare state provisions. From a lens of corporate citizenship 
and the political nature of CSR such a role of corporations is just consistent. The controversy and 
the dismissal of the Indian approach then  is largely based on ignorance with regard to the 
specific capacities, roles and governance structures of BGs in India.  
 
 
6.2 Geographical context of Business Groups 
 
This special issue is quite focused on emerging economies, most notably India and Korea. In 
some ways that is not surprising given the large significance of BGs in these countries. 
Arguably, it also reflects a fairly developed community of scholars – local or based elsewhere – 
with an interest in the role of businesses and CSR in these specific countries, and an institutional 
environment that makes sufficient data available. As the paper by Cuervo-Cazurra points out, the 
developing or emerging economy context presents a specific context that has strong influence on 
the nature of CSR and wider pro-social activities of BGs. It also argues further that the nature of 
CSR changes quite significantly with development, resulting in a shift in focus from social to 
economic and environmental aspects of CSR. This difference is already visible if we compare 
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the papers with data from India to those with data from Korea in this special issue. Although not 
specifically focused on BGs but built largely based upon interviews with leaders of BGs in 
emerging markets, Gao et al.’s (2017) theoretical paper proposes that in emerging markets, a 
favorable reputation acts as a “meta-resource” that allows a firm to activate its conventional 
resources and overcome information-based voids. They further propose that in emerging 
markets, a favorable reputation can be a source of long term survival and enables a firm to 
capitalize on new opportunities and buffers firms against threats. The greater the extent and 
degree of institutional voids in an environment, the greater the upside of reputation’s meta-
resource effects will be the authors propose. This framing is in line with the suggestion to look at 
BGs’ CSR from a development perspective. 
 
BGs, however, also exist in developed, Western economies. Many of the large influential 
companies in Sweden, Italy, or France, but also several enterprises in economies dominated by 
the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of the firm, such as the USA, Canada or Australia, are BGs. As such, 
their CSR approach has been understudied and the black box of the nature of the firm in those 
specific countries has been underexplored. For instance, there is quite a substantial body of work 
on the specific Scandinavian forms of CSR, based on some ‘Scandinavian model’ of business 
(e.g. Strand and Freeman, 2015). There is however very little appreciation that such a model is 
crucially dependent on a different understanding and practice of what a corporation is and how it 
relates to the political economy and to the implicit contract with the social democratic state. The 
absence of short termism, the focus on stakeholders beyond shareholders or the focus on local 
communities and the interests of a certain region or country in Scandinavian firms is not just a 
cultural attribute of these countries. It is rather predicated on a historically grown different model 
of what a firm should be in purpose, intent and execution that informs a different approach to 
corporate contributions to the public good and, more contemporarily, CSR. An explicit 
appreciation then of the nature of the firm would lead to a better and more powerful explanation 
of CSR in those countries and why and how it differs from other societal contexts. Overall, we 
suggest a context based theoretical approach to CSR of BGs with no convergence to a standard 
global model that focuses on the evolution of institutions within countries. 
 
An emerging and even less understood phenomenon is BGs formed through government 
controlled investment companies and sovereign wealth funds. This form departs from the state 
controlled BGs in China where the control is established through the political party in power. In 
case of Ministry of Finance Incorporated in Malaysia for example, the majority of chairmen are 
current or former politicians and bureaucrats although the operational management is largely 
entrusted to professionals. The Malaysian state has an ownership interest in 35 of the top 100 
Malaysian companies who between them account for 40% of total market capitalisation with a 
direct or indirect interest in over 68,000 companies (Gomez et al, 2018). This means that the 
state retains the ability to intervene in the running of the company if necessary through informal 
ties. In a similar vein, the primary sovereign wealth fund in Singapore, Temasek, has at least a 
15% stake in 30 listed companies. An analysis of the composition of the boards of the 30 
companies shows that, while the majority of CEOs were professionals, two-thirds of the 
chairmen had state or political affiliations and that one-third of companies had over 30% of their 
board members who were in some way affiliated with Temasek. This also means that the states 
retain the ability to intervene in the running of the company if necessary through informal ties. 
BGs in such geographical and political contexts – often paired with democratic deficits, thus may 
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assume a rather ambiguous role with regard to social responsibility and their enhancement of the 
public good depending on the nature of the state. 
 
 
6.3 The ambiguities of CSR in the context of BGs 
 
Fundamentally, the phenomenon of CSR in BGs and their impact on and contribution to the 
public good is underexplored. As the papers in the special issue show, most BGs have a rather 
strong engagement in CSR  in philanthropy and charity. This is a classic ‘bolt-on’ approach to 
CSR, where companies share and ‘give back’ part of their economic success while at the same 
time paying less attention to the question in how far the generation of their success complies with 
societal expectations, such as employee’s rights or environmental impacts. Such an approach to 
‘built-in’ forms of CSR appears to be rather reluctantly embraced by BGs. As the papers on the 
darker features of BGs, such as blocking market access or tax avoidance in this special issue 
demonstrate, a stronger focus on the specific nature of CSR in BGs finally could also inform a 
more normative research agenda.  
 
A similar ambiguity surrounds the general role of BGs particular in emerging economies. In the 
same vein as Pattnaik et al.’s argument in this special issue with regard to manipulation of 
product markets we observe a similar role of BGs with regard to most notably capital markets in 
their specific jurisdictions. The internal capital market is an important characteristic of BGs 
through which group affiliates access finance from each other. Existing studies have shown that 
continued dependence on internal capital market reduces the motivation of group affiliates to 
disseminate corporate information to information intermediaries such as stock analysts which 
restricts the development of external capital market (Pattnaik et al.2013; Chang et al. 2000). It is 
in this context that there is a greater need to shift the academic discourse to examine the ethical 
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Author(s), year National focus Sample Period Keyword Manuscript type Key findings related to CSR in business groups
DAP group in Paraguay has taken an active role in CSR. However, the use of genetically 
modified soy seeds and agrochemicals have caused more harm than benefits to the 
environment and society.
Empirical
CSR activities adopted by the Chinese are different from the Western countries. Large oil 
companies in China see CSR in the oil industry in Africa as the responsibility of the African 
government.
Pegg, 2012 China 1990s to 2000s Business group Conceptual
Dávila, Dávila, 2014 Colombia 1911-1985 Business group Historical
Talisayon, 2010 Philippines 1970s to 2000s Business group 
Conglomerate
Conceptual There are large conglomerates in Philippines that see CSR activties as investment. The 
diverse culture and the reluctance of centain ethnicities may be a hinderance to more CSR 
activities being implemented. 
Fundación Social (FS) group has complex CSR strategies that balance their aid towards 
social and economic issues with financial management activities in Colombia. 
The CSR stretegy of Volvo Group is based on its Code of Conduct, which Volvo strictly 
adheres. Volvo Group's CSR strategy has helped the enterprise to gain trust among 
stakeholders. 
Hoque, Uddin, Ibrahim, 
Mamun, 2014
Sweden 2000s Business group 
Conglomerate
Conceptual
Guereña, 2013 Paraguay 2013 Grupos economicos
Kantabutra, Avery, 2011 Thailand 2000s Business group 
Conglomerate
Conceptual Siam Cement Group was found to comply with majority of the Rhineland criteria and 
practices. Sustainable leadership principles are prevalent in this large enterprise in 
Thailand.




Japan 1997-2000 Keiretsu Empirical Network affiliation in keiretsu system does not share common corporate social 
performance (CSP) due to low strategically shared assets. The environment that an 
industry operates in has a larger impact on its CSP.  
Choi, Lee, Park, 2013 South Korea 2002-2008 Business group Empirical
Oh, Chang, Martynov, 2011 South Korea 2002 - 2004 Business group Empirical Ownership by top managers has negative relaionship with CSR ratings due to complex 
structure of chaebols. Large chaebols are powerful enough to resist any CSR reforms 
introduced by the government.
There is a positive relationship between company size and CSR activities. The paper 
argues that CSR is a western philosophy that is not suitable for developing countries.
The relationship between CSR ratings and level of earnings management is weaker for 
chaebol firms and firms with highly concentrated ownership.  CSR practices can thus be 
abusively used by business group affiliated firms to conceal their poor earnings quality.
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Montecchia, Di Carlo , 2015 Italy 2010s Business group Empirical
Marano, Tashman, Kostova, 
2016
Emerging markets 2004 - 2011 Business group Empirical CSR reporting by emerging market multinationals is an effective way to overcome the 
negative perceptions in host countries about firms' ability to conduct legitimate business 
activities. Business group affiliation does not influence CSR reporting intensity.
Affiliates tend to adopt similar corporate social disclosure (CSD) as their parent if their 
products are related. Business groups with unrelated products tend to follow the CSD of 
businesses in a similar industry. Exoisomorphism pressure is deemed as the main reason 
for different levels of CSD.
Aditya Birla Group started its CSR activities by giving social and economical aid to the 
people in India. The group later also took initiatives by being more environmental friendly 
in their operation processes.
Tata group has CSR policy which they strictly follow. Tata group was able to link business 
practices with social well being in an effective way.
Shah, 2014 India 2012 - 2013 Business group 
Conglomerate
Empirical
Min, 2017 South Korea 2001 - 2014 Business group Empirical




This paper examines the scope of CSR activities that Bajaj Group is involved in.The Bajaj 
Group has developed over 40 public charitable trusts engaged in CSR activities.
Sheikh, 2017 India 1920s to 2010s Business group 
Conglomerate
Historical/ Review
Chaebols tend to adopt CSR more efficiently than non-chaebols. Chaebols has the 
tendency to fit CSR activities adopted domestically into their international diversification 
strategies. However, domestic CSR activities will reduce if international diversification 
increases.
Cho, Chun, Choi, 2015 South Korea 2005 - 2010 Conglomerate Empirical
Chaebols see social evaluation to be as importance as innovation after nation wide 
economic crisis in 1997. The research shows how the effects of business groups on 
institutional logics are mediated through the focus on CSR and materialistic innovation.
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Table 2: Comparison of neo-classical theories of the firm with more a more contemporary approach to the theory of the firm in a 




theories of the 
firm 
A theory of business 
(Donaldson/Walsh) 
The perspective of 
business groups 




• Optimize collective 
value and  
• Maximize own 
legitimacy  
Accountability To the law and the 
firm’s owners 
To all participants in a 
particular business 
To 
• Society at large,  
• Controlling 
shareholders  
Control Guard against self-
seeking with guile 
Prohibit assaults on 
participants’ dignity 
• Guard against self-
seeking of the 
controller  











Figure 1: Three dimensions and contingent factors in analysing business groups 
 
 
 
